Thoughtful article in neighbor’s newspaper!!

Those who read my earlier post about The nation's editorial might think that my attitude towards Pakistan's  media is negative,  but that’s not true.

Here in this post… I posting very thoughtful and fair article of Abbas Nasir. Article is published in Dawn newspaper’s website on 26th November of this year. Writer of that article is a former editor of Dawn. Though I am not agree with all the things he said in the article but still its worthy enough to be appreciated.

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Title + Link of the article: Colour-blind accountability
Published: November 26, 2011 in Opinion section.

THE Kargil conflict was raging and I was sitting in the office when the switchboard put a call through. The call was to dramatically alter my perception of that Himalayan conflagration.

After all it was following a long internal debate that the BBC coined the phrase `Pakistan-backed forces` for the combatants. These armed men had occupied the commanding heights, enabling them to sever the strategically important Srinagar-Leh Highway as it now lay within their range of fire.

Tension was mounting as Delhi was insisting that those occupying the heights on its side of the Line of Control were infiltrating Pakistan Army regulars. Pakistan was sticking to its guns that it was Kashmiri guerrillas fighting to free their land.

Therefore, the BBC had to evolve the terminology which enabled it to refer to the conflict in a neutral manner. This was warranted anyway as the harsh terrain and the dizzying altitude meant the theatre of the conflict was inaccessible to journalists.

All we could do was to report the conflict based on the claims and counter-claims of the two parties involved. Every effort was made to diligently and clearly attribute the claims to the side making them.

Tension was mounting. The situation wasn`t helped at all by the fact that it had hardly been a year since India had carried out nuclear tests, forcing tit-for-tat nuclear explosions by Pakistan. There were fears of a possible nuclear clash. It was around this time that I received the call.

After identifying himself, the frantic caller told me he was calling from Sharjah airport, was en route to Pakistan and needed the help of BBC Urdu Service which, he had been told, had carried the news of his brother`s death in Kargil.

Within minutes, I was on the line to our Srinagar correspondent Altaf Hussain who told me the Indian army had brought some bodies from Kargil to Srinagar and showed them to the media.

The Indians wanted to reinforce their claim that it was not Kashmiri militants but Pakistan regulars fighting in Kargil to retain control of the heights they had stealthily captured in early spring after their adversaries had vacated these ahead of the last harsh winter.

Altaf described the young officer and said he`d been identified by a signed letter in his pocket ostensibly written by his sister. I called back the Sharjah mobile and gave all the details including the letter`s contents and the sender`s name.

The person at the other end went quiet but quickly recovered his composure to say: “That is most certainly my younger brother, Captain Karnal Sher Khan. My sister did tell me about the letter and no one else would have known her name.

“I will forever be grateful to you for letting us know. Our own government tells us nothing. In fact, they haven`t told us anything for several months since he first went away on this long assignment. He was last posted to the NLI (Northern Light Infantry).

“We have a right to know. Don`t get me wrong we are several brothers and each one of us will gladly give his life for Pakistan. But why doesn`t our government own its shaheeds ? They may not be proud of our brother`s sacrifice but we are. He beat us to it.”

Wouldn`t you be lost for words? I didn`t quite know how to react, what to say. In a sense, it was a relief when the call ended. This one call had confirmed to me that regulars were engaged in Kargil.

When the fallen soldier`s brother complained of being kept in the dark I obviously put it down to operational reasons. It was to emerge later that even the air force and naval chiefs were not told.

The then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, also says he didn`t approve the operation nor was he informed. This claim is refuted by Gen Musharraf who along with a handful of his trusted generals had himself planned it and gave it the go-ahead.

The operation first hailed by some Pakistani defence analysts as “tactically brilliant”, soon turned out to be a strategic nightmare as the planners had no exit strategy especially since the scenario they had predicated it on was all wrong.

The Indians refused to talk and despite taking a heavy loss of life (said to be 3:1)* responded robustly, bringing in heavy artillery and slowly retaking some of their lost positions after cutting the supply lines, where any existed.

For its part, the international community felt Pakistan hadn`t acted as a “responsible” nuclear power should and called on it to withdraw its forces. Even China reportedly remained adamant that Islamabad was in the wrong and should pull out.

This isolation spelt disaster for the military planners who wanted to take the Indians “by the scruff of their neck” and, at the very least, secure their pullout from the Siachen Glacier.Fearful of what a spiral would mean, the US became proactive. Sharif was asked to fly to Washington. President Clinton met him on a national holiday and issued a call to `restore the Line of Control`. Pakistan was offered nothing in return.

Sharif`s July intervention may have prevented a full-blown war, even a nuclear exchange, but it was to irreparably damage his relations with his out-of-line army chief. By September, the prime minister`s brother Shahbaz was in the US successfully soliciting a statement against a military takeover.

When Capt Karnal Sher Khan`s body was being returned to Pakistan, even the Indians talked of his valour; of how the young officer on a mission impossible did the honourable thing: fight to the very end. Finally, Pakistan also extended recognition: it awarded him the Nishan-i-Haider.

But those who had sent this valiant young man and hundreds of others like him to die in a pointless conflict, shamed the nation and overthrew an elected government have not been held to account. Our khaki-colour-blind accountability process remains unmoved to this day.

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Article Copyright: 2011 DAWN.COM

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* India's official casualty figures is 527 dead and 1363 injured. Pakistan confirmed that 453 soldiers were killed. Number of people injured is at least more than 400 according to Pakistan army's website.

PAK-FA’s Painting

Good photograph, Good softwares & Little painting skills can produce nice looking digital art. Below is one example of such digital art (Painting). Though I am not satisfied with the painting but its just because I finished it in hurry and my 100% effort is lacking in the painting.

I used PAK-FA’s photograph which is taken by ‘Vladislav Hokum Perminov’ during the MAKS 2011 Airshow.  I not draw everything in details and also engines of the plan is drawn differently to make the PAK-FA looks good. Also color scheme is not same as in the photograph.

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Russian PAK-FA (T-50)  during the MAKS 2011.

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Painting of Russian PAK-FA (T-50).

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I used ‘Paint.NET v3.5.8’ for initial line drawing of PAK-FA and after that I used ‘TwistedBrush Pro Studio v17.00’ for coloring it.

What does IAEA’s new report says about Iran’s Nuclear intentions?

What does IAEA’s (International Atomic Energy Agency) new report says about Iran's nuclear program's intentions. Here is excerpts of IAEA’s report on IRAN's nuclear activities:

This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011), as well as issues of longer standing, and, in line with the Director General’s opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, contains an Annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency’s concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

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Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).

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Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

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The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

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While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

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The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

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Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.

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The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.

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The Agency has continued to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As additional information has become available to the Agency, the Agency has been able, notwithstanding Iran’s lack of engagement, to refine its analysis of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

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According to the Agency’s assessment of the information contained in that documentation, the green salt project (identified as Project 5.13) was part of a larger project (identified as Project 5) to provide a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme. The product of this programme would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies (identified as Project 111). As of May 2008, the Agency was not in a position to demonstrate to Iran the connection between Project 5 and Project 111. However, subsequently, the Agency was shown documents which established a connection between Project 5 and Project 111, and hence a link between nuclear material and a new payload development programme.

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Under the AMAD Plan, Iran’s efforts to procure goods and services allegedly involved a number of ostensibly private companies which were able to provide cover for the real purpose of the procurements.

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In addition, throughout the entire timeline, instances of procurement and attempted procurement by individuals associated with the AMAD Plan of equipment, materials and services which, although having other civilian applications, would be useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device, have either been uncovered by the Agency itself or been made known to it.

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However, ... , information contained in the alleged studies documentation suggests that Iran was working on a project to secure a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme, the product of which would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies.

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The uranium metal document is known to have been available to the clandestine nuclear supply network that provided Iran with assistance in developing its centrifuge enrichment capability, and is also known to be part of a larger package of information which includes elements of a nuclear explosive design. A similar package of information, which surfaced in 2003, was provided by the same network to Libya.

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In an interview in 2007 with a member of the clandestine nuclear supply network, the Agency was told that Iran had been provided with nuclear explosive design information. From information provided to the Agency during that interview, the Agency is concerned that Iran may have obtained more advanced design information than the information identified in 2004 as having been provided to Libya by the nuclear supply network.

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As the conversion of HEU compounds into metal and the fabrication of HEU metal components suitable in size and quality are steps in the development of an HEU nuclear explosive device, clarification by Iran is needed in connection with the above.

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Information which the Agency has been provided by Member States, some of which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials such as tungsten.

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The Agency has information provided by a Member State that Iran may have planned and undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear explosive device. In particular, the Agency has information that Iran has conducted a number of practical tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment would function satisfactorily over long distances between a firing point and a test device located down a deep shaft. Additionally, among the alleged studies documentation provided by that Member State, is a document, in Farsi, which relates directly to the logistics and safety arrangements that would be necessary for conducting a nuclear test. The Agency has been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.

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The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111. From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.

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While the activities described as those of Project 111 may be relevant to the development of a non-nuclear payload, they are highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.

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Full Report can be accessed from below links:

Link 1: IAEA report on IRAN's nuclear activities, November 2011

Link 2: IAEA report on IRAN's nuclear activities, November 2011

Note: Both the links is of same report.