Another blow to Iran's nuclear program

Another bomb explosion in Iran.., Another  Iranian nuclear scientists died.., Another blow to Iran's nuclear program.., Everything happening like Hollywood movie. Here I am posting article from guardian’s website, writer is Julian Borger.

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Published: 11 January 2012

Tittle + Link of the original article: Goading a regime on the brink

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The car belonging to Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan is lifted at the site of an explosion outside a university in northern Tehran.

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Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan was not the first Iranian nuclear scientist to be killed like this. In November 2010, not very far from the scene of today's assassination there were two identical attacks, in which a motorcycle drew up alongside the victim's car while it was in traffic and the riders stuck a magnetic bomb on the door. The bombs detonated as the assassins rode off.

One of those bombs killed Majid Shahriari, a member of the nuclear engineering faculty at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran who was working on research projects with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The other slightly wounded Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, the subject of UN sanctions and widely suspected in the West of involvement in nuclear weapon design.

In a reflection of his importance in the Iranian programme, Abbasi-Davani was made the head of the AEOI a few months later. Both he and Shahriari were big fish, like the first victim of the assassination campaign, a senior physicist, Masoud Ali Mohammadi, killed in January 2010 when a bomb on a parked motorcycle exploded as he walked to his car.

Ahmadi-Roshan, who was killed in today's blast, is reported to have held the position of deputy director at the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, one of the most controversial parts of the programme. Iran is the subject of a string of UN Security Council resolutions and four sets of sanctions calling for it to suspend enrichment.

Not all the victims have been so senior. In July last year, gunmen on motorbikes shot dead July 2011, Darioush Rezaeinejad, an electronics student who was according to some accounts working on high-voltage switches, a component of nuclear weapons among other things.

The killers are clearly using loose criteria in choosing their victims. Any connection to any part of the nuclear programme seems to be enough to be selected as a target of opportunity.

Iranian officials have been quick to blame Israel, and the Israelis have not been going out of their way to avoid suspicion. On Tuesday, the head of the Israeli Defence Force, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz was quoted as telling a parliamentary panel that 2012 would be a "critical year" for Iran in which it would be subject to "unnatural" events.

The Israeli military establishment have a motive to claim successes in the covert war on Iran, because they are under political pressure to start an overt one. The generals, however, know that Israeli air strikes would unleash a war without accomplishing their goal of destroying the Iranian nuclear programme.

A covert war, based on assassinations and sabotage, may appear a better alternative. Individual killings may not seriously hinder a large, wide-ranging programme, but they would certainly deter young Iranians from taking that line of work.

But such a campaign is not without huge risks for the region. The regime in Iran has clearly tried to hold its nerve, avoiding overt reprisals that might in turn provoke a military response. But elements of the establishment do seem to be lashing out in frustration.

Last October's bomb plot against the Saudi ambassador and Israeli diplomats in Washington, alleged to be the work of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, was both amateurish and extremely reckless. If Americans had been killed in the Georgetown restaurant that was supposedly the target, the Obama administration would have been obliged to respond militarily.

Likewise, the storming of the British embassy, on the anniversary of Shahriari's assassination, appeared to have gone much further than the leadership had intended, and significantly deepened Tehran's isolation.

"The old guys at the top are losing control of the situation," a senior western diplomat observed, the day before this latest killing. The fragmentation of the regime will have unpredictable, and possibly very violent outcomes. The pressure of sanctions is building. There is a lot of military hardware in the Gulf right now, some of belonging to the regularly Iranian navy and some to the Revolutionary Guards, who have their own agenda. Whoever is killing Iran's scientists is clearly willing to risk catastrophic consequences that could engulf the region.

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Copyrights: © 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Secret war against Iran's nuclear program

Came across another interesting article about  Iran’s nuclear program and ongoing secret war to prevent Iran from getting nuclear bomb. Published in haaretz website today, writer is Yossi Melman. When world is watching things every development very closely  there is already secret war going on. 

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Article title + Link: The war against Iran's nuclear program has already arrived

Author: Yossi Melman

Copyrights: Haaretz.com

Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad / Photo: Alon Gaash

 

Explosions, deadly computer viruses and other sorts of 'accidents' - someone is targeting Iran's nuclear project: either the Western intelligence agencies, internal opposition groups, or both.

   

The war is under way, though no one declared it and no one will confirm it. This is the secret war against Iran's nuclear project. It did not start this week or last month. It has been under way for years, but only faint echoes have reached the public.

In June 2010, the press reported that the computer system operating the uranium enrichment centrifuges at Natanz had been infected with a virus. A deadly worm, known as Stuxnet, had infiltrated the controllers, manufactured by Siemens.

Two weeks ago, a huge blast ripped through a Revolutionary Guards military base 40 kilometers west of Tehran. The explosion could be heard as far away as the capital. Dozens of people were killed, including the head of Iran's missile development project, General Hassan Tehrani Moqaddam. This week, there was a powerful explosion in Isfahan, Iran's third-largest city, which has a uranium conversion plant on its outskirts. It is not yet clear what was damaged in the blast.

These incidents involved three key elements of Iran's nuclear program. The first is uranium conversion (which comes after the mineral has been mined), the second is enrichment, and the third is the delivery means.

Coupled with other incidents, including the assassination of several Iranian nuclear scientists, these events have worried the ayatollahs' regime, causing reactions ranging from embarrassment to anger. The public response usually follows a pattern: first a sweeping denial, then a limp and stuttering admission that "something happened," and finally the claim that it was an "accident." This shows that the regime does not know exactly what to say, and that its voice is not uniform. It also reflects the fierce dispute within the regime's top ranks. The leadership is divided, and the reactions come from a range of ministries, rival organizations and competing media outlets.

The kind of sabotage used in Iran requires sophistication, financial and technological resources, agents and precise intelligence. Someone, for example, had to know that General Moqaddam would be at the base that day to supervise a test, apparently of a new missile engine.

Infecting the computers required access to them: A person with a flash drive had to have plugged it into the system. The prevailing assumption is that foreign intelligence agencies are initiating, managing and executing the secret operations.

The Iranians, and international media outlets, believe these operations are the work of Israel's Mossad and possibly also a Western partner such as the CIA or Britain's MI6.

The Mossad's campaign to assassinate the Black September members behind the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre was code-named "Wrath of God." This week, when asked whether God had carried out the recent operations in Iran, former Mossad head Meir Dagan smilingly said yes. Dagan is known to be an ardent supporter of secret operations, as he told Yedioth Ahronoth explicitly this week. He believes it will be at least two years until Iran can assemble a functioning nuclear weapon. This assessment may be based on past secret operations and on Dagan's faith that future actions can indeed disrupt Iran's progress.

A senior American official went even farther. President Barack Obama's special assistant and coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation and terrorism, Gary Samore, said in May 2011, "I'm glad to hear they are having troubles with their centrifuge machines, and the U.S. and its allies are doing everything we can to make it more complicated." Do we need any clearer statement that humans are behind the "hand of God"?

Even if the Mossad or the CIA are not involved in these incidents, the speculation that they are serves Western intelligence bodies by enhancing their image as "omnipotent," and heightening the Iranian leadership's fear. This is known as psychological warfare.

Still, with all due respect for Western intelligence's great efforts - including what is probably unprecedented operational coordination - it is unlikely these operations could have succeeded without inside support, meaning from individuals or groups ready to help sabotage the ayatollahs' regime. It should be remembered that Iran is a mosaic of ethnic minorities, and almost all have reasons for disliking the regime; some have their own underground armed militias.

The theory about inside-help gains traction given that, in addition to the military targets, other sites - including oil facilities, gas pipelines, trains and military bases - were also damaged over the past year. Last year there was a considerable increase, of at least 10 percent, in "breakdowns" and "accidents" at Iran's strategic infrastructure sites. Some were caused by poor maintenance, due in part to the international sanctions, but the volume of these incidents may also indicate the "hand of God" was involved. If this is the case, then it's possible that internal Iranian opposition groups (as opposed to exiles) are stronger and even better organized than generally thought.

It is almost certain that Tehran's patience is about to run out. This was evidenced by the student mob's "conquest" of the British embassy this week. This was not spontaneous rage: It was a warning from a regime that realizes someone has declared war on it without leaving marks or fingerprints.

Sooner or later, the ayatollahs' regime will decide to react and will order its secret intelligence and operational units to retaliate. If and when this happens, Iran will take steps to conceal its involvement in such activities. However, past experience proves that despite the caution and sophistication of the Iranian secret services, they have often failed in obscuring their fingerprints.

What does IAEA’s new report says about Iran’s Nuclear intentions?

What does IAEA’s (International Atomic Energy Agency) new report says about Iran's nuclear program's intentions. Here is excerpts of IAEA’s report on IRAN's nuclear activities:

This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011), as well as issues of longer standing, and, in line with the Director General’s opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, contains an Annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency’s concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

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Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).

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Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

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The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

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While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

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The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

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Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.

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The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.

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The Agency has continued to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As additional information has become available to the Agency, the Agency has been able, notwithstanding Iran’s lack of engagement, to refine its analysis of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

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According to the Agency’s assessment of the information contained in that documentation, the green salt project (identified as Project 5.13) was part of a larger project (identified as Project 5) to provide a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme. The product of this programme would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies (identified as Project 111). As of May 2008, the Agency was not in a position to demonstrate to Iran the connection between Project 5 and Project 111. However, subsequently, the Agency was shown documents which established a connection between Project 5 and Project 111, and hence a link between nuclear material and a new payload development programme.

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Under the AMAD Plan, Iran’s efforts to procure goods and services allegedly involved a number of ostensibly private companies which were able to provide cover for the real purpose of the procurements.

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In addition, throughout the entire timeline, instances of procurement and attempted procurement by individuals associated with the AMAD Plan of equipment, materials and services which, although having other civilian applications, would be useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device, have either been uncovered by the Agency itself or been made known to it.

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However, ... , information contained in the alleged studies documentation suggests that Iran was working on a project to secure a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme, the product of which would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies.

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The uranium metal document is known to have been available to the clandestine nuclear supply network that provided Iran with assistance in developing its centrifuge enrichment capability, and is also known to be part of a larger package of information which includes elements of a nuclear explosive design. A similar package of information, which surfaced in 2003, was provided by the same network to Libya.

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In an interview in 2007 with a member of the clandestine nuclear supply network, the Agency was told that Iran had been provided with nuclear explosive design information. From information provided to the Agency during that interview, the Agency is concerned that Iran may have obtained more advanced design information than the information identified in 2004 as having been provided to Libya by the nuclear supply network.

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As the conversion of HEU compounds into metal and the fabrication of HEU metal components suitable in size and quality are steps in the development of an HEU nuclear explosive device, clarification by Iran is needed in connection with the above.

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Information which the Agency has been provided by Member States, some of which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials such as tungsten.

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The Agency has information provided by a Member State that Iran may have planned and undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear explosive device. In particular, the Agency has information that Iran has conducted a number of practical tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment would function satisfactorily over long distances between a firing point and a test device located down a deep shaft. Additionally, among the alleged studies documentation provided by that Member State, is a document, in Farsi, which relates directly to the logistics and safety arrangements that would be necessary for conducting a nuclear test. The Agency has been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.

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The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111. From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.

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While the activities described as those of Project 111 may be relevant to the development of a non-nuclear payload, they are highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.

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Full Report can be accessed from below links:

Link 1: IAEA report on IRAN's nuclear activities, November 2011

Link 2: IAEA report on IRAN's nuclear activities, November 2011

Note: Both the links is of same report.

Stuxnet… Most sophisticated cyber weapon ever deployed

Today I read very interesting article on The New York Times webite. Below is some parts of that article. Hope you will like it.

Iran's Nuclear Facilities

Stuxnet is the name given to a computer worm, or malicious computer program, that began to spread in mid-2009. It may the most sophisticated cyber weapon ever deployed.

Stuxnet turned up in industrial programs around the world. But experts dissecting it soon determined that it had been precisely calibrated in a way that would send nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control, adding to suspicions that it was meant to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.

It appears to have wiped out roughly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and helped delay, though not destroy, Tehran’s ability to make its first nuclear arms. After its spread, intelligence officials began to talk of setbacks in Iran's program that could delay the day it is able to produce a nuclear weapon.

Many mysteries remain, chief among them, exactly who constructed a computer worm that appears to have several authors on several continents. But the digital trail is littered with intriguing bits of evidence, many of which suggest that the virus was designed as an American-Israeli project to sabotage the Iranian program.

The worm itself now appears to have included two major components. One was designed to send Iran’s nuclear centrifuges spinning wildly out of control. Another seems right out of the movies: The computer program also secretly recorded what normal operations at the nuclear plant looked like, then played those readings back to plant operators, like a pre-recorded security tape in a bank heist, so that it would appear that everything was operating normally while the centrifuges were actually tearing themselves apart.

Stuxnet at natanz

The attacks were not fully successful: Some parts of Iran’s operations ground to a halt, while others survived, according to the reports of international nuclear inspectors. Nor is it clear the attacks are over: Some experts who have examined the code believe it contains the seeds for yet more versions and assaults.

Dimona Nuclear Facility

The Dimona complex in the Negev desert, the heavily guarded heart of Israel’s never-acknowledged nuclear arms program, became a critical testing ground in a joint American and Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s efforts to make a bomb of its own.

Behind Dimona’s barbed wire, the experts say, Israel spun nuclear centrifuges virtually identical to Iran’s at Natanz, where Iranian scientists are struggling to enrich uranium. They say Dimona tested the effectiveness of the computer worm, a critical step in honing its effectiveness.

The paternity of the worm is still in dispute, but officials from Israel have broken into wide smiles when asked whether Israel was behind the attack, or knew who was. Several obscure hints hidden deep within its code suggest a possible Israeli origin -- or an attempt to deceive investigators.

Article copyrights:  The New York Times
Pictures copyrights: Various Sources